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Despite the central theoretical role bequests have played in economic models of inter-
generational exchange (Yaari, 1965), there remains considerable controversy about their current
and future importance. Some argue that bequests are a primary motive for saving (Kotlikoff and
Summers, 1981; Juster and Laitner; 1996), that they are an important mechanism for supplying
incentives for appropriate care-giving behavior between the elderly and their adult children (Cox,
1987; Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers,  1985), and that they are a central part of the solution to
financial problems associated with population aging.  In this view the baby-boom generations
will eventually receive significant estates from their parents who have benefitted from the stock
market boom, alleviating the tax burden necessary to support the older generation.  Others argue
that bequests have had little direct role as a motivation for private savings, do not facilitate
interactions across generations, and that they have had little impact on the well-being of future
generations. 
Regardless of the economic model that leads to bequeathing behavior, the elderly hold
substantial amounts of wealth, and are likely to leave large bequests.  For example, Gale and
Scholz (1994) estimated that the annual flow of bequests in 1986 was $105 billion.  Flows of this
magnitude make the study of bequests worthwhile both from the point of view of their possible
macroeconomic effects and from the point of view of how they will affect the behavior of the
receiving households.
However, our understanding of bequest motives has been limited by problems inherent in
measuring the bequests that individuals anticipate making and the bequests that they actually
make.  One approach has inferred bequest intentions from changes in wealth accumulation with
age, especially among older households  (Hurd, 1989).  Because wealth is observed with error,
however, the change in wealth can have very substantial error, making it difficult to base
estimation on observed individual-level data.  In addition to any contamination due to large
measurement error in wealth, unanticipated capital gains at the macro level can cause observed
wealth change to differ from anticipated wealth change.  A second approach to understanding
bequests has been to examine patterns of actual bequests, relying on estate records (David and
Menchik, 1985) or on IRS data (Wilhelm, 1996).  Even though estate records and IRS data can
increase our understanding of the magnitude of bequest flows and of motivations for bequests,2
they represent bequeathing behavior of the very well-to-do, and are not representative of the
general population. Furthermore, they contain limited information about recipients and donors,
which impedes the estimation of models of bequests.
In this paper we study bequest behavior in the general population by developing new
methods  to measure both anticipated bequests and actual bequests.  Anticipated bequests have
several advantages over studies based on wealth change or on actual bequests.  Anticipated
bequests are likely to reflect the long-term environment in that they reflect long-term savings
objectives.  For example they are likely to incorporate long-run rates of return on assets whereas
both actual wealth change and actual bequests reflect short-term ex post realizations.  Since
anticipated bequests are measured in panel surveys,  we can also track how intentions to
bequeath evolve over time, especially in reaction to the large wealth increases associated with
the recent stock market boom.   
Our study of actual bequests uses data on the estates of a large, representative sample of
decedents.  Because these decedents had previously been surveyed,  their actual bequests can be
compared to their previously stated bequest intentions as well as their prior levels of household
wealth.
This paper is divided into four sections. The next section outlines the theoretical model
that informs our thinking about bequests.  Section 2 has information about the data and the
variables constructed from those data.  Our research is based on unique data from several waves
of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) that measure the bequests that households anticipate
bequeathing, and the actual bequests that they leave.  Section 3 describes our methods for
estimating the expected bequests of individuals and households, and the distribution of those
estates across potential heirs. The fourth section contains our principal empirical findings
concerning the level and distribution of expected bequest across birth cohorts, the expected
inheritances to be received by children of these birth cohorts,  and the amount of dissaving
anticipated by these birth cohorts. 
Section 1. Theory
Much of the economic literature on bequests has focused on distinguishing among three
prominent motives for bequests:  altruistic, strategic and accidental.  Altruistic bequests reflect 3
the care individuals have about future generations, particularly their children and grandchildren
(Becker, 1981; Mulligan, 1997). There are two main implications of inter-generational altruism
for bequests. First, bequests will depend on the relative economic status of succeeding
generations: when their economic status is approximately the same bequests will be small. 
When the older generation is considerably better off, bequests will be large.  The second
implication is that at the household level the largest bequests should go to the least well-off
children. 
The strategic motive specifies that bequests are the outcome of an implicit or explicit
contract made between the generations.  Transfers between the generations represent payments
that will be made conditioned on the observed behavior of the other generation (Cox, 1987;
Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers,  1985).  For example, parents may use the prospect of future
bequests to induce their children to provide assistance to them when they are old.   Finally, the
accidental motive views bequests to be the result of a necessary precaution against the inherent
uncertainties associated with the end of life (Yaari, 1965).  Individuals would like to have
consumed all their assets by their death, but because the date of death is uncertain, they will die
with assets and hence leave bequests.
Our goal here is not to posit tests that distinguish among these motives, but rather to
develop new methods of measuring the magnitude of total bequests and their distribution.
Whatever the motive for bequests, expected bequests of households represent a combination of
their assessment of the wealth they may have at each future age, and the probability they will die
at each age and bequeath that wealth. Thus, the starting point for expected future bequests
involves the shape of the optimal path of household wealth at older ages. 
A useful framework to derive the optimal path of household wealth is the life-cycle model
of consumption as explicated in Yaari (1965) and Hurd (1989).  A typical solution is an equation
of motion in marginal utility of consumption
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where ut = marginal utility of consumption at time t
ht = mortality risk (mortality hazard)
Vt = marginal utility of bequests at time t.  
D  the subjective time rate of discount and r the real interest rate (constant and known)
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The main implication is that when there is no bequest motive the consumption path will
begin to decline at some age following retirement.  That age depends on the utility function and
mortality risk, but once the consumption path begins to decline it will continue to decline at all
greater ages.  Because there is no utility associated with bequests, wealth must also decline:  if
wealth were to increase it would continue to increase at all greater ages so that wealth would be
bequeathed with probability 1.0.  This cannot be optimal.  Based on prior estimation, the path of
consumption by single men should begin to decline when they are in their late 60s and of single1An increase in life expectancy via an unexpected decrease in mortality risk at all ages will reduce bequests
were there no behavioral response to the change in mortality risk: individuals would consume more of their
bequeathable wealth before they die. If there is a behavioral response, however, bequests could increase: a decline in
mortality risk will flatten the consumption path and reduce initial consumption, causing more wealth to be held
against the increased risk of outliving resources.  The total effect is ambiguous.
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women at about age 75 (Hurd, 1989).  Therefore, we should observe declining wealth at these
ages or earlier.  Unless annuities are zero, bequeathable wealth will be completely consumed
should a household survive to advanced old age, and consumption will equal annuity income
after that age. However, because the probability of dying is positive at any age expected bequests
will be positive even in the absence of a bequest motive.  Bequests will be accidental (Yaari
(1965)), but if individuals are sufficiently risk averse, bequests could still be a large fraction of
bequeathable wealth.  
At sufficiently advanced ages such that individuals plan to dissave, the population will
dissave provided on average the anticipations of individuals are realized. In this situation the pure
effect of age (or equivalently surviving to another year) on bequest probabilities is unambiguous
in a stationary environment. As illustrated in Figure 1, for ages greater than 69 wealth will
decline with increasing age and thus expected bequests must decline.
1  For example, should
someone survive from 70 to 71 and die at an age equal to life expectancy, their age of death
would increase from 85.4 to 85.8, and at the latter age wealth is lower. 
In cross-section, greater wealth should be associated with higher anticipated bequests
even without a bequest motive:  the wealth path in Fig. 1 is shifted out. In panel data, there is no
direct relationship between wealth change and anticipated bequests if the observed wealth change
is due to anticipated dissaving.  In Figure 1 panel wealth change will be positive at ages less than
69 yet the change in anticipated bequests would be negative because life expectancy is
approximately 15 years.  Both panel wealth changes and bequest changes will be negative at ages
greater than 70, but, even at advanced ages, there will be no stable relationship between the
change in wealth and the change in bequests in panel. An unanticipated wealth change should
change anticipated bequests. For example, an increase in wealth through a stock market
expansion should lead to an increase in anticipated bequests. 
An explicit bequest motive means that individuals place value on holding wealth, which
reduces consumption, causing wealth to decline less rapidly with age. An increase in the bequest2The main weighting is for oversamples.  See Juster and Suzman (1995) and Soldo, Hurd, Rodgers and
Wallace (1997)
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motive, say through the birth of a first grandchild, would flatten the consumption path, and
reduce initial consumption further, causing more wealth to be held and expected bequests to
increase.
Section 2.  Sources of Data
Our research uses a set of companion surveys representative of the cohorts born in 1947
or earlier. These surveys include the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), the Assets and Health
Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD), the Children of the Depression Age (CODA), and the
War-Babies Cohort.  HRS is a national sample of about 7,600 households with at least one person
in the birth cohorts of 1931 through 1941.  HRS age-eligible persons were about 51-61 years old
at the baseline interview in 1992.  The first companion survey, AHEAD, includes 6,052
households with at least one person born in 1923 or earlier; the AHEAD subjects were aged 70 or
over at the initial interview in 1993.  Two-year follow-ups were conducted for both surveys, and
by 1998 four waves of HRS and three waves of AHEAD were completed.  In 1998, these surveys
were augmented with baseline interviews from the cohorts of 1924-1930 (the CODA cohort with
2,320 households ) and 1942-1947 (the War Babies with 2,528 households). We will refer to the
collection of all the cohorts in 1998 as HRS98.  We organize the research in this paper around the
birth cohorts of individuals or of households.  That is, a person born between 1924 and 1930 is
assigned to that birth cohort no matter which of the HRS98 samples in which he originally
appeared.  In married households, birth cohort is assigned by randomly selecting the birth cohort
of a spouse. All data are appropriately weighted.
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Three measures are central to our research: household wealth, anticipated bequests, and
actual bequests.  Regarding household wealth, HRS asks about house value and mortgage, and
about non-housing assets in the following eleven categories;  real estate; vehicles; business
equity; IRA and Keogh; stocks and mutual funds; checking savings and money market funds;
CD's, government savings bonds and treasury bills; other bonds; other assets; and other debt. 
HRS has adopted several innovative techniques to improve the quality of wealth data and is7
widely regarded as providing one of the better measures of wealth in those household surveys
that lack a high-income over-sample (Juster and Smith, 1997). 
We derive anticipated bequests from the reports about the subjective probability of
leaving a bequest greater than or equal to several target amounts.  The basic form of the
subjective probability of bequest questions can be illustrated with the initial question asked about
a $10,000 target. “Using a number between 0 and 100 what are the chances that you will leave an
inheritance of at least $10,000?”  Respondents had previously been instructed to interpret 0 as
absolutely no chance and 100 as absolutely certain.  If the answer was 31 or more, the question
was repeated but with a target of $100,000. If the answer was 0, respondents were then asked the
probability of leaving any positive bequest.  In the case of a couple, each spouse was asked these
questions independently.  The subjective probabilities were ascertained for the cohorts in HRS98
and in the preceding waves for HRS and AHEAD, with the exception of the HRS baseline in
1992.
In prior work we have subjected the subjective bequest probabilities to a number of
validity checks.  They covary strongly with wealth;  for example, AHEAD respondents in the top
wealth decile report 0.78 to be the average probability of a bequest greater than or equal to
$100,000, whereas those in the lowest wealth decile report an average probability of just 0.01
(Smith, 1999a).   In panel the subjective bequest probabilities pass a test for stationarity which
combines rational expectations with predictive validity for actual bequests (Hurd and Smith,
2001)
Our third central measure is actual bequests and how such bequests are divided among
potential heirs. Bequests are inherently difficult to measure in the population and most applied
research on inheritances has relied on estate records (David and Menchik, 1985). While valuable,
estate data can provide only a limited picture as the great majority of inheritances are below the
estate tax thresholds and so do not appear in official estate records. The strategy pursued here
relies instead on 771 “exit” interviews.  Exit interviews are interviews by proxy of those who
died between the first and second wave of the AHEAD survey.  The proxy respondent, usually
the widow or widower or a child of the deceased, was asked about the value of the estate, to
whom the estate was bequeathed and the specific amounts that were received by each heir. These
data have the advantage of describing the complete distribution of inheritances in the population,8
not just those in wills or probate.  By linking to the AHEAD wave 1 survey we have detailed
information about the deceased during the years prior to their death. 
Actual Bequests
Table 1 shows the distribution of the estates of 771 respondents who died between the
first and second wave of AHEAD.  As would be expected from the unequal distribution of
wealth, the distribution of estates is dispersed and highly skewed.   One in five of the deceased
AHEAD respondents had an estate of no value.  The mean estate was $104.5 thousand but the
median was much lower, $62.2 thousand. Some respondents leave relatively large estates: 30%
are $120,000 or more and 5% are in excess of $300,000. Only 3% of the estates were valued at
$600,000 or more, which was the lower limit for estates to be subject to the estate tax.
Consequently, estate tax records are extremely incomplete and they give a very distorted picture
of bequests and the attributes of households who bequeath. For example, AHEAD deceased
respondents left bequests worth more than 73 million dollars, but only one quarter of that value
would appear in estate tax files. 
One way of testing the quality of exit interview reports is to compare the value of estates
with reports of wealth by the deceased in the prior wave of the survey. Absent any significant
death related costs, the value of assets reported in the prior wave and the value of estates should
be similar. The last three rows of Table 1 provide that comparison by listing both exit interview
reports of estate values and household wealth as reported in wave 1 by the AHEAD respondents.
When there is no surviving spouse, mean estates values are quite close to AHEAD wave 1
household wealth.  However, in married households the estate is quite close to non-housing
wealth, suggesting that when there is a surviving spouse the house, which is often jointly owned, 
is not included in the estate. On average across both types of households wave 1 wealth was
$133.7 thousand, and the estates averaged $104.5 thousand.  
As shown in Table 2, most financial inheritances are bequeathed to the immediate family. 
A surviving spouse received at least three quarters of the estate while about one-fourth went to
children.  At the death of the surviving spouse more than 90% went to children.  Consequently,
all other beneficiaries were left relatively small amounts of money.  Aggregating across all
decedents, those outside of the immediate family received only 10% of the total bequests. Among3As explained in the table, for couples wealth is a weighted average of non-housing and of total wealth to
amount for the fact that a bequest from one spouse to the other appears not to include housing wealth.  Were we to
use total wealth, the excess of wealth over bequest probabilities would be even greater.
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these people, friends received 1% and contributions to charity were relatively modest, about
$1,200 per estate. 
Table 3 displays the distribution of inheritances received by the children of AHEAD
decedents.  Most children received nothing from their parents estates.  Even when the death
involved the last surviving parent, more than 40% of children received nothing. Many other
children were left just a few thousand dollars.   Still, a reasonable fraction of adult children were
bequeathed a significant amount of money.  One in every ten children collected $45,000 or more 
from an estate of their parent and one in every hundred got at least $250,000. 
Table 3 understates the amount of inheritances received by children from their parents
because one part of the inheritance is always missing. The column labeled “no surviving spouse”
includes only the inheritances children received from the last surviving parent ignoring any
inheritance they received when the first parent who died. The column labeled “surviving spouse”
ignores future inheritances children will receive when their last parent dies.  Our methods, which
are based on expected bequests, will avoid this undercounting.
Bequest probabilities and wealth
Many of the qualitative conclusions of this paper are based on a comparison of subjective
bequest probabilities and household wealth, both averaged over members of birth cohorts. Such
comparisons are presented in Table 4.   The table shows the percent of persons with wealth at
least as large as the $10,000 and $100,000 bequest targets and the average of the subjective
probabilities of leaving bequests at or above those two targets.
3  For example, about 88% of
people born in 1923 or earlier had wealth at least as large as $10,000;  yet, if the subjective
bequest probabilities are accurate predictors of actual bequests, just 66% of them will die with
bequests of $10,000 or more.  Similarly, about 57% of the cohort had wealth of $100,000 or
more, but only 38% of them will leave a bequest of $100,000 or more.  While the precise
numbers vary, at both targets all cohorts reported lower average bequest probabilities than
wealth. The implication from these data is that bequests will be less than current wealth;  that is,4Some individuals gave partial answers to this sequence. For example, they answer the $10,000 or more
question, but do not answer when asked the $100,000 target question. In this case, all we know is the probability of a
bequest of $10,000 or more. In our computation of expected bequests, we allow for all possible bequest intervals. 
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individuals on average anticipate significant dissaving before they die. 
Although the questions about the subjective bequest probabilities do not specify whether
the bequest is in constant or current dollars, we believe that most people think in terms of
constant purchasing-power dollars.  Therefore, we will interpret our results about saving or
dissaving to be in real terms.  Were we to interpret the responses to be in nominal terms, the real
rate of dissaving would be greater.
Table 4 indicates that bequests are likely to grow over time. For example, the proportion
of those who anticipate leaving a bequest above $100,000 is 46% among those born between
1942-1947 compared to 38% among those born in 1923 or earlier. Secular increases in the size of
estates are not surprising in light of the increases in the lifetime wealth of successive cohorts.
Section 3.  Methods for Estimating Household Bequest
In this section, we outline our methods for estimating the expected future bequest of each
individual and household and how those bequests are likely be distributed among potential heirs.
The data used for these calculations are based on total household wealth and non-housing wealth,
the individual responses about bequest probabilities, and the estate divisions as revealed in the
AHEAD exit interviews.
From the sequence of bequest probability questions, we can calculate for each individual
his or her probability of leaving a bequest of zero and the probability of a bequest in the
following bequest intervals:  $1-9,999, $10,000-99,999, $100,000 or more.
4
Then the expected bequests for each individual i can be expressed as
(2) EB EB B I PB I ii j i j () ( | )( ) =∈ ∈ ∑
where E(Bi | B 0 Ij ) is the expected bequest given the bequest is in interval Ij and Pi (B 0 Ij) is the
probability the bequest is in Ij.   The Pi (B 0 Ij ) are known from individual responses to subjective
bequest questions so we need to know only the expected bequest in each bequest interval. 
We estimate expected bequests in each bequest interval in two steps. The first step5Because (w100 -100k) ÷ w100 is unlikely to be the same as (w10 - 10k) ÷ w10,  neither (w100 - 100k) ÷ w100 nor
(w10 - 10k) ÷ w10 can be applied to all of the wealth observations between w10 and w100.  Rather we apply a linear
interpolation to the amount of the shift that will be applied to the points between w10 and w100.
11
involves deriving the likely distribution of expected bequests in the population without assigning
a bequest value to any specific individual. The second step involves the assignment of a specific
bequest value from this bequest distribution to individual respondents.  
Consider the first step of obtaining the distribution of expected bequests in the population.
From the answers to the subjective bequest questions we observe the population average of three
probability points of the bequest distribution: P(B > 0), P(B > 10k) and P(B > 100k).  Our basic
strategy is to shift to the left the actual wealth distribution of the population until it matches these
three probability points of the bequest distribution, while preserving the shape of the wealth
distribution.  For example, let w100 be the point on the wealth distribution such that P(W > w100 ) =
P(B > 100k).  Because the bequest distribution is shifted to the left of the actual wealth
distribution, w100 > 100k, and the implication is that a person who holds w100 in wealth at baseline
plans to dissave the fraction (w100 - 100k) ÷ w100 of his wealth before he dies.  We then apply the
same fractional amount of dissaving to all persons with wealth greater than w100 and call the
resulting distribution the distribution of anticipated bequests for those bequests > 100k.  To
illustrate, assume that 30% of the population assert that they will leave a bequest greater than
100K while exactly 30% of the population have actual wealth greater than 150K.  In this case,
150K-wealth households plan on average to dissave one-third of their wealth, a fraction we apply
to all wealth values above 150K to obtain a bequest distribution above 100K.  In a similar way,
we find w10 which satisfies P(W > w10) = P(B > 10k).  Someone with initial wealth of w10 plans to
dissave a fraction of their initial wealth (w10 - 10k) ÷ w10 before dying.
5
We now have two population-wide distributions: actual wealth and estimated bequests
and we need to assign a specific bequest value to each individual.  For each of the bequest
intervals for which an individual has a positive probability of leaving a bequest, we assigned a
bequest that depends on his bequest probabilities and on his actual wealth.  The bequest value
assigned in an interval will be at the same percentile in the bequest distribution for that interval as
that person’s actual wealth percentile where the actual wealth distribution is taken over those
with a positive bequest probability in that interval.  Among those with positive probabilities of12
bequests in any interval, the ranking of bequests will be exactly the same as the ranking of actual
wealth.
Consider, for example, the bequest interval, $10,000-$99,999.  We selected a sample of
people with positive probabilities of bequests lying in that interval and then ordered them by their
actual wealth. We have a distribution of bequests that lie between $10,000 and $99,999 that are
also ordered from lowest to highest value. We make the bequest assignment so that the top wealth
percentile persons are assigned the highest bequest values, the next highest wealth percentile
persons the next highest bequest values and so on until all assignments are completed.  The same
procedure is done for the other bequest intervals.  Then the  expected bequest for each person can
be calculated from equation (2) as the sum of Bi  Pi where Bi is the within-interval bequest
assigned to the individual and Pi is the probability the bequest lies in that interval.
There are two additional issues that arise in married families:  how to treat the house
when there is a surviving spouse and what to do with the two spousal responses to the subjective
bequest questions. The evidence from the data is that housing equity is not counted as part of the
bequest when the first spouse dies:  as shown in Table 1 the average actual bequest was the same
as average non-housing wealth when there was a surviving spouse, while the average actual
bequest was approximately equal to total household wealth when the last surviving spouse died.
Consequently, for married individuals, the procedure for assigning a bequest value in each
interval was followed twice, once using total household wealth and once using total non-housing
wealth. The bequest values obtained from the non-housing wealth distribution were used when
the individual left a surviving spouse while the bequest values from the total wealth distribution
were used when the individual was the last spouse to die.
           In married families, both spouses were asked about their bequest expectations and they
typically gave quite different answers.  We interpret the answer to the expected bequest of each
spouse to be the expected value of the estate at the time of that spouse’s death.  Assume for the
moment that the probability that the husband dies before the wife is approximately 1.0.  Then his
answer to the subjective bequest questions reflects his expected bequest of total non-housing
assets at the time of his death while his wife’s answer reflects her expected bequests of total
household wealth upon her subsequent death. This interpretation takes into account any dissaving
between the time the husband dies and the time the wife dies: reporting by the wife has6To distinguish between the first and second bequest among couples with no housing requires an
assumption about the differential rate of wealth depletion before and after the death of the first spouse. We assume
that annual rate of wealth depletion of the surviving spouse is the same as that observed for currently non-married
households. Therefore, E(Bh |dies second)= sw E(Bh | husband dies first) (1- $ × E (YrsLife)) where  sw is the share of
the husband’s estate left to his wife when he dies first, E (YrsLife) is the expected remaining years of life of the wife
at the time of her husband’s death, and $ is the annual rate at which wealth is depleted after the husband’s death
until the final bequest of the wife.  $ is actually a vector of coefficients that vary by age and are estimated by
comparing current wealth and expected bequests among the sample of currently single households. Using the sample
of non-married households, $ is computed as (W(t)–E(B))/ (W(t)× E(YrsLife)) where W(t) is current household
wealth and E(B) expected bequests. A separate estimate is obtained for age brackets 50-50, 60-69, 70-75, 76-79, 80-
85, and 85+.  Using this relationship, we distinguish between the first and second bequest. 
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information about that dissaving. 
In the more usual case, the husband will die before the wife with a probability that we can
calculate from standard life-tables.  The details of those calculates are shown in the Appendix.
The expected bequest of each spouse can be expressed as an average of the death-
weighted probabilities of leaving a bequest if that spouse dies first and if that spouse dies last.
For example, the husband’s expected bequest is Pa (h) × E(Bh | husband dies first) + (1 - Pa
(h))×E(Bh| husband dies second).
6 
We also distinguish between bequests made by an individual to which the preceding
discussion pertains, and bequests made by the household making sure not to double-count
bequests made by one spouse to the other.  Household bequests are those made to persons or
institutions outside of the household, and exclude bequests made from one spouse to the other. 
Let f(sh) be the fraction of the estate bequeathed to the wife by the husband and f(sw) the share of
the estate bequeathed to the husband by the wife. Then, the expected bequest by a married
household to persons or institutions outside of the household is
             (1- f(sh)) Pa (h) × E(Bh | husband dies first) +  (1 - Pa (h))× E(Bh | husband dies second) 
            + (1-f(sw)) (1 - Pa (h))× E(Bw  | wife dies first) +  Pa (h)× E(Bw | wife dies second). 
To allocate an expected bequest by a household among its heirs we need to estimate how
estates are divided. To obtain these rules, we used the exit interviews available from the 771
AHEAD decedents who died between the first and second wave of the survey.  We computed
shares of estates given to the following categories of heirs:  surviving spouses, children and
grandchildren, siblings, other relatives, friends, and charity. These shares were computed7By our interpretation of the bequest probabilities, the values are all in 1998 dollars.
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separately by whether there was a surviving spouse, whether there were surviving children, and
by sex of the decedent. 
For example, let f(c) be the fraction of estate that is bequeathed to children. We allow this
fraction to vary by the sex of the donor and by whether there is a surviving spouse and by
whether there are any surviving children.  Then in married families, the expected value of estates
that goes to children can be expressed as 
               f(c1) Pa (h)× E(Bh | husband dies first) +   f (c2) (1 - Pa (h))× E(Bh | husband dies second) 
            + f(c3) (1 - Pa (h))× E(Bw  | wife dies first) +  f(c4) Pa (h)× E(Bw | wife dies second). 
The index c1 through c4 indicates the fraction of total estate going to children when (1) by the
husband when he died first, (2) by the husband when he died second, (3) by the wife when she
died first (3), and by the wife when she died last. 
In this formulation, children receive bequests from their parents in two stages. The first
stage involves the bequest received upon the death of the first parent and the second the
additional bequests received when the last parent dies. Our computation of expected bequests
includes both stages and allows bequests to vary by whether the mother or father dies first. 
Section 4- Expected Bequests and Their Distribution
In this section, we summarize our principal findings organized around the following
topics: cohort levels of expected bequests, the division of expected estates among heirs, the
extent of dissaving that will take place at older ages, and the response of bequest intentions to
unanticipated wealth increases.
4.1 Expected Bequests by Cohort
With the assumptions outlined in section 3, we can calculate  expected bequests of
individuals in the HRS98 cohorts.  Table 5 shows our estimates of the means and medians of
expected bequests along with the means and medians of household wealth.
7  The medians of
expected bequests are considerably lower than their means.  Such inequality is not surprising
given the dispersion and skew in household wealth, but bequest inequality is greater than wealth8The wealth and expected bequests in Table 6 differ from those in Table 5 in two ways.  First, the unit of
observation is the household rather than the individual so that household weights are used.  Second, the expected
bequests in Table 6 excludes bequests from one spouse to another whereas Table 5 includes bequests to a surviving
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inequality particularly in the older cohorts.  For example the ratio of the median to the mean
among the cohort born in 1923 or earlier is 0.45 in wealth, but just 0.26 in bequests.
Median expected bequests increase steadily across birth cohorts until the median bequest
among those born between 1942-1947 is about $100,000, more than twice the median bequest of
those born in 1923 or earlier.  While the median expected bequest increases across birth cohort,
median household wealth reaches its cross-sectional peak among those born between 1931-1941. 
Even though the cohort of 1942-1947 has less current wealth than the older cohort, they believe
they will leave larger bequests. The implication is that younger cohorts anticipate that their
wealth will continue to grow, so that by the time they are the same age as the 1931-1941 cohort
they will have higher wealth.  Anticipated growth in wealth is reasonable in that the youngest
cohort was 51-56 in the 1998 HRS interview, and has a number of years of future earnings.  This
indicates that in answering questions about expected bequests individuals are quite forward
looking in that they do not base their responses on current wealth levels alone.    
Our estimated  mean expected bequest by the AHEAD cohort (about $181,000) is more
than twice as large as that obtained in the AHEAD exit interview for decedents as shown in Table
1 ($94.5).  There are several reasons for this difference.  First, even at the baseline interview,
survivors had higher household wealth than the AHEAD exit-interview decedents and for this
reason alone they should bequeath larger amounts. Second and more important, due to the sharp
run up in the stock market, AHEAD survivors experienced a very large wealth increment
between the first and third wave of the survey.   Apparently, a sizable fraction of this new wealth
will be bequeathed to their heirs, a subject to which we turn below. 
4.2 Division of Estates
We applied the division patterns shown in Table 2 to the individual expected bequests
discussed in the previous section to estimate bequests by the household. Table 6 shows mean and
median values of three concepts; household wealth, expected household bequests to all those
outside of the household including children, and expected total bequests to all children.
8  spouse as part of the expected bequests by an individual. 
9Wealth levels are lower since individuals who comprise married couples are wealthier than single
individuals. These married individuals receive less weight at the household level than at the individual level. 
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The cohort patterns of wealth and expected bequests are similar to the individual level
analysis in Table 5.
9  Household wealth reaches a maximum with the cohort of 1931-1941, but
then drops by about 25% for the cohort of 1942-1947.  Yet total mean expected bequests are
about the same for both cohorts and the median expected household bequest rises uniformly
across cohorts.  Our explanation is that the younger cohort which was 51-56 in the HRS98
interview anticipates additional saving and wealth accumulation before they begin to dissave. 
Expected bequests to children are composed of bequests at the death of one spouse and
bequests at the eventual death of the surviving spouse. Even though just 22% of the bequest at the
death of the first spouse was given to children (Table 2), about 80% of all estates are eventually
bequeathed to children.  Following the pattern of bequests, there is a strong secular rise in the
value of estates left to children, especially for median values. The median value of  bequests to
children of the oldest cohort is about 22 thousand dollars and increases to 61 thousand dollars to
children of the youngest cohort.   The inequality in total bequests to children is greater than in
total bequests which in turn exceeds the dispersion in household wealth. 
 The inheritance by a child depends on the estate bequeathed to the children of the
decedent, on how an estate is divided among the children in the family, and on the number of
children.  Consistent with other findings, the dominant pattern in the AHEAD exit interviews is
that parents give equal financial inheritances to their children:  in multiple child families each
child was bequeathed the same amount in 81% of cases (not shown).  Therefore in our estimates
of future inheritances by each child, we assume equal distribution of the total estimated amount
that was bequeathed to children.  
Children with more siblings will receive a smaller bequest for two reasons. First,
wealthier families have fewer children; second, the smaller estates of larger families are divided
among more children.  For example, in the AHEAD wave 2 exit interview, families with two
children had average estates of $121,000.  Of this amount $60,000 went to the children, so that
each of the two children received $30,000.  In families with five children, the total estate was17
only worth about $65,000 of which $27,500 went to children, so that each of the five children
received only $6,700.  This pattern of lower bequests per child in large families implies that
distribution of bequests among  children will be more unequally distributed than bequests are
themselves.  
Table 7 shows the distribution of expected inheritances per child.  About one in five
children will receive no inheritance and most will receive rather modest amounts.  For example,
while the mean inheritance per child is almost fifty thousand dollars, we estimate that the typical
child of a member of the AHEAD cohort will ultimately receive only about eight thousand
dollars. However, one in every ten children will eventually receive more than $111,000, while
one in twenty will get at least $191,000.
Children of more recent cohorts will tend to receive larger bequests for two reasons: 
estate values will increase in size and the average number of children will decline. As shown in
Table 6 median expected bequests to children increase monotonically with recency of cohort. 
Furthermore,  family size reached a maximum in the 1931-1941 cohort.  Taken together these
factors lead to a median inheritance by the children of the youngest cohort of $19.2 thousand,
more than double the median of the children of the oldest cohorts.
Nineteen thousands dollars is still a modest sum, the flow from which can only finance
small additional consumption flows over a lifetime. In spite of the large secular increases in
estate values and in the amount of resources transferred at death, most adult children of parents of
the generations 1947 and earlier can not expect to receive much help from their parents in the
form of inheritances.  As far as the distribution of inheritances is concerned, we estimate that
inheritances by children will become more unequal in the future than they were in the past.  The
top five percent of children of those born between 1942-1947 will get over $380,000, double the
amounts received by the children of the pre 1924 cohorts.  
4.3 Do Households Dissave during Old Age?
Whether the elderly will dissave during later life is one of the most controversial issues
regarding household savings behavior.  In part, this controversy is about establishing which
economic theory is most consistent with the data because the prediction that they do in fact
dissave is a central implication of the pure life cycle model. But there are other important reasons10Because of measurement error in expected bequests and in wealth, we take the ratio of average bequests
to average wealth where the averages are calculated by cohort.
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for wanting to know whether the elderly dissave. If they do dissave, their ownership of economic
resources will decline with age and, should they survive to advanced old age, they may be poor.
Because the elderly own substantial amounts of assets, dissaving by them could reduce the
national household saving rate, a particular concern given their growing numbers. 
There are several reasons why the dispute continues over what should be a simple
empirical fact.  The limited evidence available from repeated cross-sectional surveys are often
contaminated by the presence of strong cohort effects which cause a negative age-wealth profile
at older ages.  Mortality selection bias will further distort the life-cycle, age-wealth relationship. 
Until recently, our available panel samples of older households were also limited and measures of
wealth change contained substantial measurement error.  Finally, both cross-sectional and panel
data on changes in wealth with age can be dominated by strong year effects such as that due to a
stock market increase or decline. Because our measure of dissaving is based on what households
intend to do over their remaining lives, it is in principle free of many of these problems. 
We use the subjective bequest probabilities to estimate future saving intentions.  Our
index of saving intentions is 
S(t)= E(B0 ) ÷ W(t)
where W(t) is current household wealth and E(B0 ) is the expected present value of bequests to
those outside the household.  That is, S(t) is the fraction of current wealth that the household
anticipates not consuming.  For single households, the expected bequest to those outside the
household is the same as the expected bequest, while for married households it is a weighted
average of the bequests by each spouse to those outside of the household as discussed earlier. 
If we compare expected discounted bequests to actual wealth holdings of a cohort, we
have an indicator of whether the cohort intends to build up its wealth in the future or to draw
down its wealth.
10  If S(t) is greater than one, cohorts anticipate saving before they die and if  S(t)
equals zero, cohorts will eventually dissave (consume) all their current wealth.  The life-cycle
model implies that households should dissave if they live to a sufficiently old age.
As shown in Table 8, part A, in the youngest age groups the fraction of wealth that will be19
saved (not consumed and therefore bequeathed) is about 37%.  This proportion tends to increase
with age.  Were the anticipated wealth path flat, this result would be expected: at younger ages
bequests take place farther in the future and so are smaller in present value.  However, according
to the life-cycle model, the wealth path should not be flat, so it is not obvious that the fraction
saved should increase in age.   Simulation of a life-cycle model for single persons as we discuss
below does show the same age pattern.
A meaningful comparison across cohorts is further complicated by differences in life
expectancy.  In Table 8, part B, we have standardized for life expectancy by reporting the
average annual rate of dissaving over the remaining expected lifetime of the cohort.  HRS
respondents anticipate that they will dissave, so all the average annual rates are rates of dissaving. 
The rates are uniformly greater among singles than among couples, and they also increase
sharply in age.  It should be noted that the table does not show the rate of dissaving by a cohort
when it is any particular age:  the rates in Table 8 part B are averages over the rest of lifetime. 
For example, the 70-74 year-old cohort will dissave at an annual rate of about 4.5% over a period
of about 13 years, which is its expected remaining years of life, but we do not know the specific
rate of dissaving at, say, 70-74.
The estimated rates of dissaving in Table 8 have implications about future financial
markets.  Several researchers have speculated about the role of demographics on capital markets
(Abel, 2000, Poterba, 1998):  as the large baby-boom generations begin to retire and sell their
assets, asset prices may begin to decline.   A key component of this argument concerns whether
retirees will actually desire to decumulate their assets.  The subjective probability of bequests
indicate that they do anticipate decumulating assets, but that decumulation will not begin in any
substantial way until the cohort is in its 70s.  At least for the foreseeable future, the fears of large
asset price declines base on rapid asset decumulation appear to be exaggerated. 
Comparison with the life-cycle model
We ask whether the patterns of wealth decumulation are consistent with the main features
of the life-cycle model of consumption.  To answer this question, we will simulate the wealth
path of a single person aged 70 and compare it with wealth paths generated from a standard life-20
cycle model.  Because the life-cycle model predicts that the rate of wealth decumulation will vary
with mortality risk, we need to know the rates of wealth decumulation by age that are implied by
the subjective bequest probabilities.  From the average annual rates of dissaving by singles, we
estimate dissaving rates by age as follows.  Among those age 85 or over, we have estimated that
the rate of dissaving will be 10.4 percent per year.  Among those 80-84 the average rate until the
date of death will be 7.4% per year, which is composed of the weighted average of the rate while
80-84 and the average rate while 85 or over.  Since we know the latter rate and the average time
that 80-84 year-olds will be 80-84 and 85 or over, we can solve for the rate of dissaving among
80-84 year-olds.  In a similar way we can find the age-specific dissaving rates among 75-79 year
olds and among 70-74 year-olds. These calculations produce annual rates of dissaving of 4.6%,
6.0%, 3.2%, and 10.4% in the age bands 70-74, 75-79, 80-84 and 85 or over. 
 The life-cycle model we will use for the comparisons is outlined in Section 1, and its










The consumption and wealth paths depend on mortality rates, annuities and wealth, and
parameters.  We take mortality risk from a 1997 life table.  The flow of annuities is composed of
$8,490 in real annuities (Social Security) and $7,560 in nominal annuities, which are averages
among 70-74 year-old singles in the 1998 AHEAD.  The nominal annuity produces a real annuity
stream that declines by 1.9% per year, the average rate of inflation from 1997 to 1999.   We take
initial bequeathable wealth to be $191,000, the average among singles in the 70-74 age band.  
The path of consumption depends on ( which we assume to be 1.12, and on r ! D , the difference
between the real rate of interest and the subjective time rate of discount, which we assume to be
0.041. These specific parameters, which were estimated over wealth change data, are taken from
Hurd (1989).  We assume r to be 0.03, but conduct sensitivity tests below.   The marginal utility
of bequests, Vt, is a constant ", which we will vary to produce simulations of different intensities
of bequest motives.  
Figure 2 shows wealth paths produced by the life-cycle model for differing values of ",11The probability of a 70 year-old surviving to age 92 is about 0.167
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and the wealth path produced by the rates of  wealth decumulation estimated from the subjective
bequest probabilities.  That curve is labeled “subjective bequests.”  The expected present value of
bequests is about 39 percent of bequeathable wealth.  The curve labeled “no bequest motive” is
simulated from the life-cycle model with " ' 0.  Wealth reaches zero at age 93 after which
consumption will be financed entirely from annuities.
11  The expected present value of bequests is
about 31% of bequeathable wealth.  In the framework of the life-cycle model all of these bequests
are accidental, so taking the model to be a true representation of desired consumption behavior
we would estimate the fraction of wealth that singles desire to bequeath to be ten percent. 
The remaining curves in Figure 2 show the wealth paths associated with different values
of ", which indexes the intensity of the bequest motive.   As shown in equation (1), a bequest
motive affects the path of marginal utility via its interaction with mortality risk:  large values of "
will reduce the effect of mortality risk.  Said differently, someone with a bequest motive acts as if
mortality risk is smaller than it actually is.  Therefore a metric for a bequest motive is the
equivalent reduction in mortality risk, which can be translated into a reduction in age through the 
life table.  For example, the curve labeled “alpha'2.2*10-6" incorporates a bequest motive with a
bequest parameter " ' 2.2×10!6.  For the parameters and interest rate we have assumed, a
bequest parameter of this magnitude will initially reduce the effect of mortality risk by about
22%, which is like reducing age by about three years.  That is, the bequest parameter makes
mortality risk appear to be that of a 67 year-old rather than that of a 70 year-old.  Because
mortality risk flattens and lowers the consumption path, more wealth will be held and
bequeathed.  The fraction of wealth expected to be bequeathed is 35%.  
Based on data from the Retirement History Survey, Hurd estimated " to be 6×10!7 which
indicates a weak bequest motive: the effect of mortality risk is reduced by six percent, equivalent
to a reduction in age of about one year, and the fraction of wealth bequeathed is just one
percentage point greater than when there is no bequest motive.  If " ' 4.25×10!6 the effect of
mortality risk is reduced by 41 percent, which is equivalent to a reduction in age from 70 to 64. 
The fraction of wealth bequeathed is 40%, slightly larger than the fraction estimated from the
wealth curve based on the subjective bequest probabilities.  In the context of the life-cycle model22
desired bequests would be about 10% of bequeathable wealth.
We have done analyses of the sensitivity of these results to the assumption about the rate
of interest.  Table 9 shows the expected present value of bequests as a percentage of bequeathable
wealth.  Because the wealth curve estimated from the subjective bequest probabilities does not
depend on the interest rate, increases in the interest rate reduce the expected present value of
bequests due to higher discounting.  In the life-cycle model, the effects resulting from higher
discounting are attenuated because of behavioral responses to the higher rates of interest, so that
the variation in the fraction of wealth that will be bequeathed is smaller.  The results is that
higher interest rates narrow the gap between bequests predicted from the subjective bequest
probabilities and bequests predicted from the life-cycle model.  At an interest rate of 5%, the
subjective bequest probabilities predict that about 31% of bequeathable wealth will be
bequeathed, and the life-cycle model with no bequest motive predicts about 29%.  Thus, desired
bequests would be about two percent of bequeathable wealth.  At an interest rate of 7%, the
bequests percentages are both about 26 percent, so that desired bequests are approximately zero.
4.4 The Elasticity of Expected Bequests to Unanticipated Wealth Increases
The sharp run-up in stock prices during the 1990s has led to considerable interest in
estimating the effect on an exogenous increase in wealth on household consumption (the wealth
effect on consumption).  Most estimates of wealth effects have examined short-run consumption
responses to wealth changes ( Hurd and Reti, 2001).  For reasons such as habit formation, risk
aversion, and fixed costs of durable purchases, households may only slowly adjust their
consumption to wealth shocks.  Thus, short-run estimates will be small compared with long-run
estimates (Juster, Lupton, Smith, and Stafford, 2001).  
We believe that our data on anticipated bequests provide a good opportunity to estimate
the long-run wealth effect.  We will use panel changes in wealth and in expected bequests to
study the elasticity of bequests with respect to wealth change over a period when stock prices
increased at rates considerably greater than they had in the past.  Under the assumption that the
bulk of the wealth changes were unanticipated, the interpretation of the elasticity will be a wealth
effect on bequests, and because the time horizon for bequests is substantial it is natural to
interpret the response to be the long-run response.  We note that according to the theory in12In simulations of a life-cycle model discussed above, we estimate an elasticity of bequests to be 1.21.
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Section 1, which was supported by our cross-sectional empirical findings, in an equilibrium
situation both wealth and bequests will decline in panel.   However, unanticipated wealth
increases should lead to increases in expected bequests.
Table 10 shows the levels of household wealth, expected discounted bequests, and
expected discounted inheritances by children in AHEAD waves 1 and 3.  Between the first and
third waves household wealth rose by $103 thousand  while expected discounted bequests
increased by about $53 thousand.  Thus about 52% of the wealth increase is expected to be
bequeathed, and most of these additional bequests will go to the children of the AHEAD cohort. 
The elasticity of total bequests evaluated at the averages of wave 1 and wave 3 wealth and
bequests is 1.30, which is close to what we find in simulations based on a life-cycle model.
12 
Bequests are a superior good in line with the observed relationship between bequests and wealth
as well as with the theoretical model (Hurd, 1995).  Our estimates in Table 10 imply that older
households foresee that eventually they will consume 48% of the between-wave wealth increases,
which is considerably greater than the short-run response estimated by Hurd and Reti (2002) and
more than twice the intermediate five year response estimated by Juster, Lupton, Smith, and
Stafford (2001) .
Conclusions
We have developed and implemented a new method for estimating anticipated bequests.
Our estimates are based on actual bequests as ascertained in exit interviews, on the subjective
probabilities of bequests, and on current levels of wealth. 
We found from the exit interview sample that the great majority of estates are
bequeathed to spouses and children, and that on the death of the surviving spouse almost all of
the remainder of the estate is given to children.  When bequests are made to children, in eighty
percent of cases bequests are made equally; that is, all children receive the same inheritance.
We found that younger cohorts will make larger total bequests to their children than older
cohorts.  For example, the median bequest by those born in 1923 or earlier will be 42 thousand
dollars, but the median bequest of the 1942-1947 cohort will be $100,000.  Wealth is, of course,24
unequally distributed, but expected bequests are even more unequally distributed.  The increase
in inequality can be explained by the life-cycle model augmented with a small bequest motive: 
those with high wealth will have a small marginal utility of consumption and, accordingly, may
continue to accumulate wealth even at advanced ages.  Those with moderate or small wealth will
have a high marginal utility of consumption and will decumulate wealth with age.  The result is
increasing wealth dispersion with age and, therefore, increasing bequest dispersion. 
Bequests will increase over time because younger cohorts are more wealthy than older
cohorts.   In spite of the secular increase, however, inheritances received by the typical adult
child will be quite modest:  less than $20,000 will be bequeathed to the median child of any birth
cohort.  Inequality in inheritances will expand from the already high levels.  For example, we
estimate that the 95
th percentile point in the distribution of inheritances will be about $190
thousand among th children of the AHEAD cohorts, but it will be about $380 thousand among
the children of the War Baby cohort.
By comparing our estimates of future bequests to current levels of household wealth, we
are able to provide evidence on a long-standing issue: the amount of dissaving that will take
place at older ages.  We find unambiguous evidence that households intend to dissave at older
ages.  We estimate that households in the age band 70-74 will consume about 61% of their
current assets, bequeathing the remainder.  Intentions to bequeath apparently respond to
unanticipated increases in wealth:  households expect to bequeath about 53% of a wealth change
that can plausibly be characterized as exogenous.  
We compared the wealth path implied by the subjective bequest probabilities with a
wealth path predicted from a life-cycle model that had been estimated over actual data on wealth
change.  The pattern of wealth change as a function of age was quite similar as was the fraction
of wealth expected to be bequeathed.   Because the wealth path based on the bequest probabilities
incorporates any bequest motive the respondents may have, we can compare it with a wealth path
generated from a life-cycle model of consumption behavior to estimate the magnitude of a
bequest motive.  As measured in this way a bequest motive causes an additional amount of
wealth to be bequeathed that varies from 10% to none whatsoever, depending on the interest rate. 
Of course a major caveat to these findings is that the life-cycle model has to be correctly
specified and estimated.  While the model we use has empirical validity in that it was estimated25
over data on wealth, changes in the parameters would give different quantitative estimates of the
effect of a bequest motive.
A straightforward interpretation of our results suggests that mortality risk is a substantial
determinant of observed wealth holdings.  Subject to rather minor variation associated with the
interest rate, the level and pattern of wealth decumulation during the post-retirement period can
mainly be explained by a model that only incorporates mortality risk.  However, to make
expected bequests as predicted by the life-cycle model match exactly expected bequests predicted
by the subjective bequest probabilities requires that the life-cycle model be augmented with a
bequest motive parameter.  For our central case (r = 0.03) the bequest motive parameter alters the
path of wealth moderately, causing the fraction of wealth bequeathed to increase by ten
percentage points.  Higher interest rates reduce the fraction of wealth bequeathed, but, of course,
we do not know that interest rate a respondent had in mind when answering the questions about
the bequest probabilities.  
More substantial evidence for a bequest motive comes from the fact that at the death of
the first spouse about 22% of the estate of the deceased goes to children.  It is not obvious how
this behavior can be reconciled with the lack of any bequest motive.  Future work will investigate
the circumstances of such bequests.
Our exploration of the strength of a bequest motive illustrates the usefulness of the
subjective bequest probabilities.  We were able to able to estimate a wealth path that was based
on data, not on a model.  While models are certainly valuable forecasting tools, it is vital to have
methods that are independent of them.  Other purely data-based methods of forecasting wealth
have drawbacks that limit their application.  For example, cross-section wealth paths cannot
control for cohort effects, and panel wealth paths cannot account for macro shocks.  Our methods
incorporate cohort differences, and, as we illustrated with the data from AHEAD waves one and
three,  they can be used to take advantage of macro shocks.26
Appendix
Probability one spouse dies while the other is still alive
Let Pa(h) be the probability that the husband dies while the wife is still alive, and consider the
calculation for a husband of age J and a wife of age 2.  Let t index years beginning from the
present date, t = 0.  The event that the husband dies before the wife can happen by the husband
dying in the coming year and the wife surviving that year, or the husband dying in the following
year and the wife surviving that year and so forth to the greatest age possible.  A life table for
men shows the number of males, Mt, that are expected to survive from birth to any given age t,
and similarly for the number of females Ft.  Then among men who have reached age J, the
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For the husband to die at age J + t while the wife is still alive, the wife must survive to age 2 + t






Under the assumption that the deaths of the husband and wife are independent, the probability of
the joint event is the product of the probabilities.   Then,














which is the sum of the joint probabilities over all possible ages at which the husband could die. 
There is a similar calculation for Pa (w), the probability that the wife dies while the husband is13When men and women were equally likely to die in the same year, we allocated these ‘ties’ in proportion
to expected mortality. That is, if the odds that a male dies first within a year was two-to-one, two-thirds of the ties in
a year were assigned to the male dying first.   
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still alive.
13  Except for approximations intrinsic in life-table analysis, Pa (w) = 1 - Pa (h).28
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Distribution of estates (thousands), AHEAD decedents
Percentile Single Married All
10  0.0 0.0 0.0 
30  2.0 35.0 20.0 
50  40.0 62.5 62.2 
70  80.0 168.2 120.0 
90  187.6 200.0 200.0 
95  250.0 500.0 300.0 
98  600.0 600.0 600.0 
Mean  estate 82.0 117.0 104.5 
Wave 1 wealth  81.6  193.7  133.7 
Wave 1 non- housing wealth 42.7  108.8  73.4
Table 2
Division of bequests (percent), AHEAD wave 2 exit interview
characteristics of decedent
spouse no spouse
bequest targets children no children children no children all
spouse 76.1  80.3 0.0 0.0  44.2 
children 22.6 0.0 91.7  0.0 45.2 
charity 0.2 17.6 0.6 5.5 1.1 
siblings 0.2 0.7 0.6  39.1 2.9 
other  relatives 0.8 1.2 5.4  44.5 5.7 
friends 0.0 0.1 1.7    9.6 1.4 
other 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.2 0.2 
total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
number of observations 302  17  284  58  661 
wave 1 wealth (1000') 209.9  188.3  82.8  110.6  144.4 
Note: Excludes estates that had no value.Table 3
Distribution of inheritances (thousands) to the children of the AHEAD wave 2 decedents 
Percentile All No surviving spouse Surviving spouse
60.0  0.5 7.8 0.0 
80.0 15.6  30.0  5.8 
90.0  45.0 65.0 25.0 
95.0 90.0  100.0  50.2 
99.0  260.0 300.0 250.0 
Mean  inheritance 18.6 27.7 10.4 
Table 4
Percent of respondents with wealth at or above targets and average bequest probabilities
target
$10,000 $100,000




1923 or earlier 88.4  66.2  57.4  38.3 
1924-1930 88.2 68.0 57.4 41.0 
1931-1941 87.4 70.7 56.2 43.5 
1942-1947 85.0 74.6 51.2 46.4 
Note: For couples, adjusted wealth is a weighted average of nonhousing wealth and total
wealth where the weights are the probability the respondent dies before his or her spouse, and
the probability the spouse dies before the respondent.  For singles adjusted wealth is total
wealth.Table 5
Wealth and individual expected bequests (thousands, weighted)
Cohort mean wealth  median wealth mean bequest median bequest
1923 or earlier 335.3  150.2  181.0  46.7 
1924-1930 342.7 162.5 183.4  58.9 
1931-1941 420.3 160.0 291.8  79.6 
1942-1947 304.3 134.6 266.7  99.5 
Note- Weighted by individual weights
Table 6
Wealth and expected bequests outside of household (thousands, weighted)
wealth total expected bequests expected bequests to
children
Cohort mean median mean median mean median
1923  or  earlier 303.6  127.1  165.1 41.5 129.6 21.8 
1924-1930 305.8  132.2  182.0 52.3 142.4 29.6 
1931-1941 363.9  133.8  256.7 75.9 229.9 48.8 
1942-1947 275.6 114.7 252.9 100.0 225.0  61.0 
Note: Weighted by household weights
Table 7
Distribution of expected inheritances (thousands per child, weighted)
Cohort of parents
Percentile 1923 or earlier 1924-1930 1931-1941 1942-1947
5.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
10.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
25.0  0.7 0.5 1.5 2.9 
50.0  7.7  7.8 12.1 19.2 
75.0  37.1 41.6 52.2 65.1 
90.0  111.0 110.9 134.2 186.7 
95.0  191.3 195.3 237.0 381.9 
Mean  inheritance 47.1 44.8 69.8 86.5 
# of children in family 2.75  3.18  3.30  2.60 Table 8
Percent of bequeathable wealth saved and annual rates of dissaving
Age Singles Couples All
A.   Percent saved
50-59 37.2 36.4 36.6
60-69 42.1 41.3 41.8
70-74 40.2 38.1 38.8
75-79 44.5 41.8 43.7
80-84 42.8 46.4 43.7
85+ 46.9 52.6 48.5
B.   Annual rate of dissaving (percent)
50-59 2.44 2.28 2.35
60-69 3.16 2.97 3.07
70-74 4.49 4.39 4.47
75-79 5.42 5.33 5.41
80-84 7.37 6.41 7.14
85+ 10.39 8.14 9.93
Note: Fraction of wealth saved calculated from the present value of bequests.  Based on an
interest rate of 3%.Table 9
Expected present value of bequests: percentage of initial bequeathable wealth
Interest rate
Prediction method 3% 5% 7%
Subjective bequest probabilities 38.9 31.4 26.3
Life-cycle model
  No bequest motive 30.6  28.7  26.8 
  " = 6×10!7 31.6 29.7 27.7 
  " = 2.2×10!6 35.1 33.0 30.9 
  " = 4.25×10!6 40.5 38.5 36.3 
Table 10
Average household wealth and expected bequests (thousands, weighted)
wealth expected
discounted bequests
expected discounted bequests to
children
AHEAD wave 1 188.1  69.5 50.3
AHEAD wave 3 289.8 122.7 93.3
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bequeathed=40%